We introduce a new measure of the extent of federal regulation, the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, and use it to investigate the relationship between federal regulation and macroeconomic performance in the U.S. We find that regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on aggregate output and the factors that produce it -total factor productivity, physical capital, and labor. In particular, regulation reduces the annual trend rate of growth in output by sevento nine-tenths of a percentage point, implying a large annual cost (currently $5.4 trillion) in foregone annual output. Regulation also has complicated dynamic effects on all variables. The effects differ across factors of production, implying both dynamic and ultimate effects on resource allocation.
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Introduction
Macroeconomists often divide government economic activity into four broad classes: purchases, taxation, deficits, and monetary policy. There is, however, a fifth class that has been almost completely ignored in both the theoretical and empirical macroeconomic literature, namely, regulation.
Although microeconomists have joined politicians and pressure groups in debating the effects and desirability of regulation, macroeconomists have devoted almost no attention to the impact of regulation on the aggregate economy. Indeed, the only exceptions of which we are aware are Blanchard and Giavazzi's (2003) theoretical study of the macroeconomic effects of product and labor market regulations and a small group of empirical papers by economists at the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999 and Forteza and Rama, 2003; Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003) that study the ability of the extent of government intervention in the economy (including regulation), perceived government effectiveness, and market rigidities to explain cross-country differences in per capita income and growth rates. 1 2 See also Friedman and Friedman (1979) , who use pages in the Federal Register as an indicator of the extent of regulatory activity, and Mulligan and Shleifer (2003) , who use kilobytes of unannoted state law, where 1kb approximately equals one page.
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In this paper, we present a new time series measure of the extent of United States federal regulation over more than fifty years. Our measure is the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, the US government publication that prints all federal regulations in existence during a given year. Such a measure has limitations, of course; for example, it cannot capture the vigor with which the regulations are enforced. However, it also is reasonable to believe that the number of pages of printed regulations bears a positive relation to the amount of regulation taking place. Federal law requires that all federal regulations be printed in the CFR; consequently, if there were no regulations reported in the CFR, there would be no federal regulation. 2 We use our measure of regulation to examine regulation's effect on the behavior of output, total factor productivity, labor services, capital services, and private investment. We find that regulation Granger-causes the macro variables but, for the most part, the macro variables do not Granger-cause regulation. We then estimate reduced-form regressions to explore the impact of regulation on aggregate economic activity. Regulation has substantial effects. Over the past fifty years, we estimate that federal regulation has reduced the trend annual growth rate of aggregate output by seven-to ninetenths of a percentage point. A reduction of that magnitude means that output is now about two-thirds (about $11 trillion) of what it would have been (about $16.4 trillion) if there had been no additions to federal regulation over the past fifty years (the length of our sample). That means the federal regulation added over the past half century now costs the US economy $5.4 trillion each year in foregone output.
To put it at a more personal level, the current annual cost is about $54,000 per household or $19,300 4 The U.S. Statutes at Large and U.S. Code are comparable to the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations, respectively, except that the former are primarily concerned with the publication and codification of laws, whereas the later are concerned with transmitting to the public written requirements to be carried out and enforced by government agencies (i.e., regulations). Thus, the CFR is more appropriate than the U.S. Code as a measure of regulation. 5 No supplement was published for 1942. The Federal Register (FR), first published on March 14, 1936 , is a daily publication in which proposed regulations appear first in draft form and eventually in final form, if passed into law. The FR also contains presidential proclamations, executive orders, announcements of agency hearings and meetings on regulatory issues, grant application instructions and deadlines, official agency decisions and actions, and agency establishments, reorganizations, and dissolutions. Sometimes, there also are long sections containing technical or economic analyses or discussion of issues arising during consideration of a proposed regulation. The final regulations (newly passed into law) contained in the FR ultimately are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Divided into 50 subject categories called titles, the structure of the CFR is similar, but not identical, to that of the United States Code. Currently, each title of the CFR is revised annually and contains all regulations in effect as of the cover date. 4 The first edition of the CFR published regulations in force as of June 1, 1938. In the early years, the CFR was not revised annually. Instead, annual supplements carried in full text all changes and additions to the 1938 edition of the CFR as published in the FR. The supplements covered the periods June 2-December 31, 1938 and subsequent calendar years through 1941, listing regulatory changes promulgated during the period and in effect on December 31 of the year in question. 5 The first revision of the CFR, scheduled for June 1, 1943 under the Federal Register Act, was postponed because of the volume of rapidly changing regulations related to World War II and the preoccupation 6 Due to the imminence of the second edition of the CFR, no supplement was issued for 1948. Regulatory changes published in the FR during 1948 were codified for the first time in the 1949 edition of the Code. 7 The term "pocket supplement" derives from pockets which were made in the books of the 1949 edition of the CFR for placement of the forthcoming supplements.
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of all government agencies with the war effort. In its place, a cumulative supplement to the 1938 edition of the CFR compiled regulations in force as of June 1, 1943. However, regulations in effect at that date whose text was identical to that in the 1938 edition of the CFR are included only by reference to the original CFR. Also, emergency controls associated with the war period are recorded by tabulation rather than codification in the cumulative supplement. Thus, the cumulative supplement served as an adjunct to the original edition rather than a replacement of it. Following the cumulative supplement, annual supplements continued to update the 1938 edition of the CFR for regulatory changes published in the FR during the remainder of 1943 and each calendar year through 1947. The wartime suspension of the first revision of the CFR was terminated in 1948 and the second edition of the CFR, recording regulations in effect on January 1, 1949, was issued.
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Following the 1949 edition of the CFR, "pocket supplements" were used to record regulatory changes published in the FR.
7 Pocket supplements differed from the annual supplements to the first edition of the CFR in that they were cumulative; that is, the pocket supplement for a given year recorded the full text of all changes to the 1949 CFR in effect at the end of the given year, irrespective of the year that the change occurred. The first pocket supplement covered changes during the June 2 to December 31, 1949 period and subsequent pocket supplements included any additional changes in effect at the end of each succeeding calendar year. So, for example, the 1950 pocket supplement 9 Beginning with the 1973 revision of the CFR, the effective revision date of each title varies within the year according to the following quarterly schedule: Titles 1-16 as of January 1; Titles 17-27 as of April 1; Titles 28-41 as of July 1; and Titles 42-50 as of October 1. -5, 14, 18-20, 26, 27, 32, 40, 41, 49 , and 50 were revised, and by 1968, all except Titles 34, 35, and 37 were revised. Beginning in 1969, all titles of the CFR have been revised annually. 
Measuring Regulatory Activity Using the CFR
The consistent codification of federal regulations in the CFR since its inception in 1938 provides a unique source of information on regulatory activity over the years. Dawson (2000) constructs series measuring regulatory activity based on the number of pages published in the CFR's various editions 10 Recall from the discussion above that the timing of revisions to the 1949 edition of the CFR varies across titles between the years 1949 and 1969. 7 and supplements. Although the number of pages of regulation cannot capture the differential effects of alternative regulations on economic activity, it affords new information on the temporal behavior of the total amount of regulation in place. The remainder of this section provides a summary of these CFRbased measures of regulation. For a complete description of the methodology used to construct the series and a statistical comparison of the various series, see Dawson (2000) .
Before counting pages, we must standardize the pages in the CFR for different words per page across the years. That turns out to be almost effortless. The CFR uses the same font and page size in all years except the very first, 1938. We converted 1938 pages to "standard" pages simply by multiplying by an adjustment factor based on average words per page computed by sampling words per page in each title of the Code. Even this adjustment turns out to be irrelevant to our empirical work below because, for reasons to be explained momentarily, we started our sample period in 1949, thus omitting the non-standard 1938 edition of the Code entirely.
Measuring regulatory activity using data on the number of pages in the CFR is straightforward in years when the CFR is revised. These include the years 1938, 1949, all years after 1969, and some years between 1949 and 1969. 10 Estimating total pages of regulation during the periods between the 1938, 1949, and subsequent revisions is more problematic. One approach, which explicitly uses all annual and pocket supplement data to estimate total pages of regulation during years in which no revision is published, adds the number of pages in a nonrevision-year's supplement to the number of pages in its corresponding complete CFR. The series that results from this methodology exhibits rapid 11 Dawson (2000) discusses the "double-counting" problem in more detail and offers some alternative methods for constructing the regulatory series based on interpolation in the non-revision years. The results of the analysis in this paper are not sensitive to the construction method, thus we restrict attention to the series discussed here. 11 Also, because we are interested in the effects of regulation on the private economy, we exclude from our 9 page count all regulations in the first six titles, which pertain to the internal organization and operation of the federal government itself. Regulation grows essentially all the time. Periods of negative growth are infrequent, and, when negative, the magnitude of the growth rate always is small. By far, the fastest growth occurs in the early 1950s. High growth also occurs in the 1970s, even though that period saw important deregulation in transportation, telecommunications, and energy. Clearly, any deregulation that did occur in those industries is more than offset by increased regulation in other areas, as Hopkins (1991) 
Estimation
We now turn to an analysis of the relationship between regulation and macroeconomic performance. We begin with a discussion of the variables we are going to examine and the data used to measure them; we then turn to Granger causality tests; and we end with an examination of two reduced-form models.
Variables To Be Examined
We want to study the effect that federal regulation has on macroeconomic activity. The obvious macroeconomic variable to examine is real aggregate output. However, regulation presumably affects the economy in complex ways. It therefore seems worthwhile to examine how regulation affects not just output but also the determinants of output. If we suppose a Cobb-Douglas production function, then output Y t is given by where A t is total factor productivity, K t is capital services, and N t is labor services. In what follows, we examine how regulation affects Y and also A, K, and N. Capital is very slow moving with a great deal of persistence, which may make it difficult to uncover a relationship between capital and regulation.
Also, there is no market-determined measure of capital or capital services; rather, measures of the capital stock are constructed by summing gross investment over time and applying estimated depreciation rates. In contrast, the gross change in the capital stock -gross investment -is much less persistent than the stock itself and is directly observed in the market. We therefore also examine the relation between regulation and gross private domestic investment.
Data: Sources and Issues
The data are annual observations for the U.S. over the period 1949 to 1999. The measure of regulatory activity R is the total page count of the CFR, discussed above. Cobb-Douglas production function assuming a capital share of thirty percent. Gross private domestic investment (I) is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts.
Phillips-Peron tests indicate that the logarithms of regulation, output, total factor productivity, labor, and investment are integrated order one and that the logarithm of capital is integrated order two.
The results for investment and capital are problematic because they are mutually inconsistent.
Investment is the change in capital. A simple calculus exercise shows that, in steady state, the growth rate of any variable X equals the growth rate of its change. Our results indicate that the growth rate of investment is stationary, which means that it settles down to a fixed value in the absence of random shocks. In contrast, our results indicate that the growth rate of capital is not stationary but instead requires further differencing, so that its growth rate is itself growing in the absence of random shocks.
This latter finding is inconsistent with stationarity of investment's growth rate. Furthermore, it seems from theoretical considerations that capital, investment, and output all should have the same order of integration; on a balanced growth path, their growth rates all should be constant. In our empirical work, we report results under the assumption that the log of capital is integrated order one. We have 13 The results for K are sensitive to the choice q. For q = 1, there is no evidence of causality in either direction; for q = 2, causality runs from regulation to K but not in the reverse direction; for q = 3, there once again is no evidence of causality in either direction; and for q = 4 or 5, causality runs from K to regulation but not in the reverse direction. We take these results to mean that q < 4 is too small a number of lags to include in the test.
12 examined the effect of treating capital as integrated order two and find that the results are qualitatively unchanged. So in what follows, we discuss only levels and first-differences of variables.
Granger Causality Tests
We are not aware of any well-developed theory of how regulation should affect the macroeconomy, so it seems prudent to begin our exploration with a completely non-structural method.
We proceed in the same spirit as Hamilton's (1983) pioneering study of oil and the macroeconomy, using Granger causality (Feige and Pearce, 1979; Granger, 1969 Granger, , 1988 Jacobi, Leamer, and Ward, 1979; Sims, 1972; Zellner, 1988) to study the relation between regulation and the macroeconomy.
The results of the bivariate Granger-causality tests between regulation and each of the macroeconomic variables are reported in Table 1 for the period 1949-1999. Let y, tfp, n, k, i, and r denote the logs of output, total factor productivity, labor, capital, investment, and regulation, respectively. In the Granger-causality tests, we examine whether )r Granger-causes )x and viceversa, where x is the log of any of the macro variables of interest. In the following discussion, we simplify the language by referring to the original unlogged and undifferenced variables, saying, for example, "regulation Granger-causes output," even though the correct description would be "the change in the log of regulation Granger-causes the change in the log of output." In the table, the notation )r÷ / )x refers to the test that )r does not Granger-cause )x. For all tests, the lag length q is 4, but the results are generally not sensitive to the choice of q.
13 Table 1 reports the results. We find that regulation Granger-causes Y, TFP, and I and that Y, TFP, and I do not Granger-cause regulation. For K, the results are the reverse: regulation does not Granger-cause K, but K does Granger-cause regulation. For N, there is no Granger-causality in either direction. We thus have unidirectional causation running from regulation to output, total factor productivity, and investment; unidirectional causation running from capital to regulation; and no causation in either direction between regulation and labor. The opposite results for investment and capital again seem inconsistent, and we have no immediate explanation for them. We also performed Granger-causality tests on the individual titles of the CFR rather than the aggregate measure. Few of the individual areas of regulation Granger-cause any of the macroeconomic variables considered here.
Why is the total CFR page count significant in Granger-causality tests whereas the individual titles are not? Testing the Granger-causality significance of the total CFR page count is in effect a joint test of the individual titles. We interpret the Granger-causality significance of the total count and insignificance of most individual titles as a demonstration that the titles are jointly but not individually significant in Granger-causing the macro variables. Insignificance of the individual titles is not surprising given that we have a rather small number of degrees of freedom.
These results suggest interesting relations between regulation and macroeconomic activity; in particular, regulation seems to affect several macroeconomic variables of interest. We therefore now turn to reduced-form regressions to explore those relations in more detail.
Regression Models
Phillips-Peron tests indicate that all the series are non-stationary; unsurprisingly, a glance at the series shows that they all have strong upward trends. There is considerable disagreement in the 14 profession over how to interpret non-stationarity, with difference-stationarity, trend-stationarity with or without trend breaks, and fractional integration all offered as plausible models (e.g., Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Murray and Nelson, 2000; Diebold and Inoue, 2001 ). We therefore examine two alternative models: (1) linearly detrended with trend breaks and (2) first-differenced. The current consensus in the profession seems to be in favor of trend-break models, so we give those more emphasis than the first-difference models.
3.4.A. Trend-Break Model.
The trend-break model allows regulation to explain the breaks in the trend of the dependent variable as well as movements about trend:
(1) or, upon taking logarithms and putting the terms in the usual order,
where, as before, x is any of the macroeconomic variables of interest, ", $, ( j , * j , and T j are constants, J i are lag lengths, and U is a log-normally distributed residual.
In (1), the first term in parentheses is a trend term; the trend coefficient is a function of regulation and relation squared, allowing regulation to cause breaks in trend. The usual practice in estimating models with trend breaks is to use an atheoretical time series approach of searching for the breaks using a statistical procedure. Our model takes a structural approach, allowing regulation to be the cause of trend breaks. This model nests within it the simpler linearly detrended model with constant 14 That is, models of the form 15 trend (( i = 0 and * j = 0 for all I and j).
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The second large term in parentheses in (1) at first appears to be purely an intercept term, but in fact it, too, contains a trend element that must be understood if the total effect of regulation on trend is to be properly accounted for. A simple version of the model facilitates discussion. Suppose regulation R obeys the law of motion where $ R is the trend in R and V is a log-normally distributed residual. Consider a macro variable X whose "intercept" term depends only on current R:
where A and T are constants, $(R t ) is the trend in X apart from $ R that may be a function of regulation, U is a normally distributed residual, " / AB T , and W is the log-normally distributed compound residual UV T . We see from the last line that the total trend in X is $(R) + T$ R . Applying these results to (1) leads to 15 We tried two other estimation methods. Instead of using a Newey-West correction, we estimated subject to the following ARMA model for u t :
here e is white noise. The results were essentially the same as those with the Newey-West correction. We also tried choosing lag lengths by dropping lag terms until we arrived at one that was individually significant. Again, the main conclusions were unchanged.
(3)
The trend coefficient is B(R t ) = $ + $ R ET j + E( j R t-J + E* j R t-j 2 , a quadratic function of regulation.
The last three terms of this function collect the total effect of regulation. In what follows, we refer to the second term $ R ET j as the trend-intercept effect of regulation, the third term as the trend-linear effect, and the fourth term as the trend-quadratic effect. (The first term $ is the trend apart from any effects of regulation.) The remaining effect of regulation is through the residuals V t-j . Because (1) is trendstationary, this last effect is purely transient, causing only fluctuations about trend. We refer to this effect as the cycle effect. were chosen by imposing a large initial value and searching over all possible smaller values to find that which minimized the Schwarz information criterion. The residuals were serially correlated, so we used a Newey-West correction. 15 The trend-intercept effect is the product of regulation's trend $ R and the sum of the T j coefficients. The latter is reported toward the bottom of Regulation has significant but different effects on all five macro variables. For all variables, regulation affects the trend in some way, usually through all three possible channels (intercept, linear, quadratic terms of the trend function). For capital, regulation's effect on trend is especially complex; for investment, it is especially simple. Cycle effects are present in all five variables; they are fairly simple for Y, TFP, and I, more complex for N, and still more complex for K. Table 2 shows that the signs of the cycle terms are mixed for each variable, indicating interesting dynamic responses to changes in regulation. It also is noteworthy that the cycle coefficients have significantly negative sums for all variables except TFP, indicating that a permanent, one-time jump in regulation ultimately shifts the dependent variable in the opposite direction. Table 3 collects the effects in summary form for easy reference.
The effect of regulation on trend is the most important issue here because it is the source of permanent changes in the dependent variables. For output, the sum of the T j coefficients is -0.263, reported toward the bottom of Table 2 ; the P 2 statistic shows that this sum is statistically significantly different from zero at less than the 1% level. The product of $ R and ET j is -0.009, so regulation shifts output's trend downward by almost one annual percentage point. This shift, being a reduction in the intercept of the trend coefficient function B(R t ), is uniform over time. In addition, regulation has time-varying effects on output's trend through the linear and quadratic terms of the coefficient function B(R t ).
The linear coefficient is positive, and the quadratic coefficient is negative. These together imply that regulation raises output's trend as regulation begins to increase over its 1949 value but then eventually reduces output's trend as regulation becomes substantially higher than its 1949 value.
The total effect of regulation on output's trend can be seen by computing the value of the B(R t )
function. The same methods can be applied to the other dependent variables to determine regulation's effect on their trends. Figures 3-6 show the results. The differences among them and also between them and Figure 2 are striking. We return to them later, but it is worth noting here that the effect on TFP is uniformly negative; TFP falls steadily in response to increasing regulation. Growth in TFP is a measure of technical progress, and our results suggest that regulation since 1949 always has reduced that growth.
Besides affecting output's trend, regulation affects output's fluctuations about trend. The first 19 three T j coefficients are statistically significant, indicating that current, once-lagged, and twice-lagged regulation affect fluctuations about trend. Note that significance here is determined by minimization of the Schwarz-Bayes information criterion (SBC). It therefore is joint significance. In fact, for output, none of the T j coefficients is individually significant at even the 10 percent level, but omitting any of the corresponding terms raises the SBC. Furthermore, if we perform an F-test on the joint significance of {T 0 , T 1 , T 2 }, we reject joint insignificance at a p-value of 0.001.
The fact that output depends on a distributed lag of regulation implies interesting dynamic effects of regulation. Unfortunately, the large standard errors on the T j coefficients render impossible precise conclusions about temporal dynamics, but if we take the point estimates at face value, the estimates imply that an increase in regulation first raises output and then subsequently lowers it by more.
Note that the sum of the three T j coefficients is negative and statistically significant (see the Table 2 ).
Consequently, a one-time permanent jump in the level of regulation would shift output in the opposite direction on net.
We see, then, that regulation has both permanent effects on output through alterations in output's trend and also has cyclical effects. In addition, the differing responses of TFP, N, and K to regulation indicate that regulation has allocative effects. The economy responds to regulation not only by changing the amount of output produced but also by changing the way it produces that output.
3.4.C. Opportunity Cost of Regulation.
We have seen that regulation's effect on output's trend varies over time but that the overall effect always is negative; the negative trend-intercept effect always swamps any positive effect from the trend-linear term. We now investigate the amount of output lost because of regulation. Figure 7 shows the ratio of the counterfactual series to the actual series. By 1999, output would have been 49 percent higher than it actually was, had regulation remained at its 1949 level. In current dollar terms, that means that output would have been $13.9 trillion in 1999 instead of $9.3 trillion.
We can bring these figures up to date if we are willing to suppose that the ratio of counterfactual to actual output for 1999 continues to apply today, which seems reasonable given that the ratio was roughly constant over the entire decade of the 1990s. In that case, private output would to about $54,000 lower annual income per household (two and a half times the amount of federal spending per household; see Riedl, 2003) ; with 280 million individual US citizens, it means about exclude tax compliance cost because taxes generally are not considered regulations. Tax compliance cost amounts to about one half of one percent of GDP, so including it would not alter our conclusions.
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$19,300 less income each year for every man, woman, and child living in the country. 16 Furthermore, these costs continue to grow at a rate of about nine-tenths of a percent per year, the difference between the counterfactual and actual trends assuming no further changes in the amount of regulation. Such is the power of exponential growth; costs that were initially negligible now have become enormous.
Finally, it is important to note that these figures are net product costs. They are based on the change in product caused by regulation and so include positive as well as negative effects of regulation on output.
Unfortunately, our cost figures are not net of everything. They include only costs and benefits included in the National Income and Product Accounts. Non-pecuniary costs and benefits, such as irritation caused by regulatory hassles and a cleaner environment are absent. It may be that net nonpecuniary benefits are sufficiently large as to make the post-1949 regulations cost-effective. Deciding that question will require accounting for non-pecuniary costs and benefits, which is beyond the scope of the present investigation.
The net output cost of post-1949 regulation dwarfs all standard estimates of regulation's direct costs, such as compliance costs and misallocation of resources. For example, Crain and Hopkins (2001) estimate the cost of all federal regulation (not just post-1949 regulation) to be about 8 percent of current GDP, or about $900 billion in 2003, about a sixth of our estimated output opportunity cost.
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The total measured cost of regulation, of course, is the sum of these two costs, or $6.3 trillion per year. 
where the first term in parentheses is the drift term, a quadratic function of regulation. Lag lengths were chosen by the same method as for the trend-break regressions. It turned out that the regulation terms in the drift term were insignificant for all variables, so the equation reduces to (5) so we will confine discussion to this simpler version. To see the effect of regulation on the drift, we first ran (5) with the T j constrained to zero (that is, with regulation omitted). The results of those regressions are reported in Section A of Table 4 . We then estimated the unconstrained regression; the results are in Section B of Regulation has statistically significant effects on all variables. For output and investment, regulation reduces the drift by statistically and economically significant magnitudes; its effect on the drifts of the other variables is imprecisely determined and not statistically significant. For all variables, regulation enters with fairly long distributed lags; the individual coefficients often are precisely determined and have mixed signs for all variables. Regulation thus has complicated dynamic effects on the evolution of all variables. The sum of the regulation coefficients is significantly different from zero 23 only for investment, for which it is strongly negative.
As before, we can calculate the counterfactual path that output would have followed if regulation had remained at its 1949 level. Figure 8 Overall, then, regulation has effects in the difference-stationary case that are qualitatively similar to those in the trend-break case but quantitatively reduced. The output effects, though smaller than in the trend-break model, still are very large.
Disaggregagted Regulation
There is an interesting pattern in Figures 3-6 . Before the early 1970s, the trends in Y, N, and K all were growing in response to growing regulation (but recall, of course, that this growth never offset the uniform downward shift of the negative trend-intercept effect on any of these variables). After the early 1970s, the trend in output turns down, whereas the trends in labor and capital rise even faster than before. The 1970s were a time of major innovation in environmental, health, and occupational safety regulations, which were different in character from the regulations in existence up to that time. Perhaps the new kinds of regulations also had new kinds of impacts that explain the patterns in the time trends.
To explore that possibility, we turn to an investigation of individual titles of the CFR.
We tried to isolate which titles in the CFR were responsible for the aggregate effects reported 24 above. To do that, we regressed our five macro variables on the set of page counts for the individual titles instead of on the page count for the titles taken together. There are thirty-one titles, leaving us too few degrees of freedom to include even one lag in the titles. We thus ran simplified regressions of the form for the trend-stationary case and for the difference-stationary case.
In the trend-stationary case, for each variable a small subset of the titles had coefficients individually significant at the 10 percent level or less. However, a joint test of the remaining titles always strongly rejected the null that the remaining titles were jointly insignificant (p-values of 0.000 in every case), implying that at least some of the individually insignificant titles are in fact significant. We thus could not identify the full set of statistically significant titles for any dependent variable.
In the difference-stationary regressions, for each dependent variable almost none (for capital, literally none) of the titles was individually significant, and the null hypothesis that the full set of titles were jointly insignificant never could be rejected. These results contradict those obtained for the aggregate measure of regulation, where total regulation had statistically significant effects on all four macro variables.
The results therefore are uninformative. The trend-stationary regressions imply that individual 25 titles are significant but cannot identify which titles those are. The difference-stationary regressions imply that no titles are significant, contrary to the results obtained earlier for regulation taken as a whole.
This general absence of information almost certainly is due to having too few degrees of freedom when all thirty-two titles are included. That causes two problems. First, few degrees of freedom leads to large standard errors, making everything poorly determined. Second, lack of degrees of freedom prevented us from including even one lag in regulation. Our earlier results for total regulation all suggested that the effect of regulation developed over time, so leaving out all lags may bias the coefficients on current regulation.
Conclusion
We have presented a new time series measuring the extent of federal regulation in the United
States. We find that regulation has statistically and economically significant effects on the time path of output, total factor productivity, labor, physical capital, and investment. Regulation alters both trends and movements about the trends. The trend effects usually are complex and non-linear. The cycle effects have lag lengths and coefficient sign patterns that differ across the dependent variables.
Regulation's overall effect on all variables is negative.
Regulation's negative effect on output is substantial. In the trend-break model, federal Regulation is a dimension of government activity that heretofore has been omitted from macroeconomic analysis. Our findings suggest that omission should cease. 
